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Property/Agency. 731 Airport Associates, LP v. H & M Realty
Associates, LLC, 799 A.2d 279 (R.I. 2002). The Rhode Island Su-
preme Court held that a property owner's oral agreement to the
essential terms of a sales transaction, together with an e-mail mes-
sage from the owner to the prospective buyer's representative, did
not amount to a satisfaction of the statute of frauds. The court also
held that the buyer had failed to demonstrate the reasonableness
of the belief that the owner's attorney possessed the apparent au-
thority to bind the seller to the purchase and sales agreement.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiffs, 731 Airport Associates, LP, and 747 Airport As-
sociates, LP (collectively referred to as buyer), filed an action
against the defendant, H & M Realty Associates, LLC (seller),
through its Member, Donald L. Leef (Leef), asserting claims for
specific performance and breach of contract "arising from an
aborted sale of property" (property) owned by the seller.' The par-
ties began negotiations for the sale of the property in March 2000,
and in May the buyer offered to purchase the property for
$1,060,000.2 The offer was rejected by seller, who submitted a
counteroffer of $1,100,000. 3 The buyer rejected the counteroffer. 4
After more negotiations between the parties, they reached an oral
agreement to sell the property. 5
The seller's counsel, James L. Truslow (Truslow), prepared a
complex purchase and sale agreement that underwent several
amendments, which resulted in two duplicate originals of a "final
agreement" in October 2000.6 Truslow sent the agreement to the
buyer, including instructions to sign and return the documents. 7 A
cover letter mailed with the agreement did not contain a limitation
that had been included in previous drafts declaring the agreement
was subject to approval by seller.8 Between the dates October 6
and October 10, 2000 the buyer submitted a check of $5,000 to
1. 731 Airport Assocs., LP v. H & M Realty Assocs., LLC, 799 A.2d 279, 281
(R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Truslow, which the seller accepted, but never cashed or deposited. 9
On October 13, 2000 the buyer was ready to complete the transac-
tion, but the seller, claiming he was not bound to perform, refused
to sign any of the transactional documents.' 0 The seller also ex-
pressed his intention to accept a better offer in the event that one
was made." The check in the amount of $5,000 was returned to
the buyer on October 20, 2000 and negotiations between the buyer
and the seller continued throughout October. 12 It was apparently
during these negotiations that the seller sent an e-mail message to
the buyer's representative in which the seller stated that the buyer
was "changing the deal your dad and I had .... ."13 Subsequently,
the seller entered into a purchase and sale agreement for the prop-
erty with another buyer for the sale price of $1,100,000.14
The buyer initiated this action for specific performance on No-
vember 8, 2000.15 At the end of the buyer's case, the court granted
the seller's motion to dismiss the action.16 Judgment for the seller
was entered in the superior court on January 18, 2001, and the
buyer appealed. 17
On appeal, the buyer argued the trial justice erred in finding
that (1) no binding contract existed between the parties and (2)
Truslow did not have apparent authority to contract on behalf of
the seller.' 8 The seller maintained the trial justice did not err. 19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Statute of Frauds
The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated a contract for the sale
of land need not be in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds as
long as there is a memorandum, signed by the party against whom
the contract is sought to be enforced, that contains the substance of
9. Id.
10. Id. at 282.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 284.
14. Id. at 282.
15. ld.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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the contract and each party has manifested an objective intent to
be bound thereby. 20 In the case at hand, however, the supreme
court denied and dismissed the buyer's appeal and affirmed the
judgment of the superior court, holding that the trial justice was
correct in concluding "the parties reached a preliminary oral agree-
ment but that certain terms remained disputed and the agreement
was not memorialized by a writing sufficient to overcome the stat-
ute of frauds."21
The buyer argued that the seller's oral agreement to the essen-
tial terms of the transaction, together with communications from
the seller's attorney, Truslow, and the seller's e-mail message to
the buyer's representative, amounted to a satisfaction of the stat-
ute of frauds.22 As a basis for this conclusion, the buyer asserted
that the duplicate originals of the "final agreement," along with the
cover letters that accompanied Truslow's communications, signi-
fied the seller's intent to be bound by the agreement. 23
The court stated the trial justice was correct in holding, how-
ever, that "no writing from Truslow suggested that seller agreed to
the terms of the sale or intended to be bound absent seller's signa-
ture."24 In addition, the court stated the trial justice was correct in
holding that the seller had manifested no intent to be bound be-
cause "the purchase and sales agreement was not signed by either
party, [the] deposit of $5,000 was delivered to seller but never de-
posited, . .. no closing date was ever agreed upon by the parties
and certain items that would have been required before the closing
never were provided to buyer."25 Further, the court stated the trial
justice was correct in holding there was no "meeting of the
minds,"26 since the seller refused to agree to the terms of the con-
tract because he was aware he might be offered a more attractive
deal by another party.27 Finally, the court stated the trial justice
was correct in finding the e-mail message from the seller to the
buyer's representative did not amount to a writing sufficient to sat-
isfy the statute of frauds, because the e-mail was "evidence that
20. Id. at 284.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 283.
23. Id. at 284.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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the parties did not have a binding agreement, but rather a transac-
tion that evolved and evolved and changed and changed, and was
never finalized .... -28
Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that the trial justice
did not err in finding that no binding contract existed between the
parties. 29
Principal and Agent
The buyer also argued that seller's attorney, Truslow, had the
apparent authority to bind the seller to the contract that the buyer
claimed existed between the parties. 30 The court stated, "Appar-
ent authority to contract on behalf of a principal 'arises from the
principal's manifestation of such authority to a [third party].' Such
apparent authority can come from 'indicia of authority given by the
principal to the agent' and does not have to be direct communica-
tion to the third person."3 ' In addition, "the third party with
whom the agent is dealing must believe that the agent has the au-
thority to bind its principal to the contract."32
The court stated the buyer had failed to demonstrate the rea-
sonableness of the belief that Truslow possessed the apparent au-
thority to bind the seller to the purchase and sales agreement.33
Thus, in addition to holding that there was no contract between
the parties, the court held that the trial justice did not err in con-
cluding that Truslow lacked the apparent authority to bind the
seller to a contract.34
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied and dismissed the
appeal of the plaintiff buyer, and affirmed the judgment of the su-
perior court for the defendant seller. The court held a contract for
the sale of land need not be in writing to satisfy the statute of
frauds, as long as there is a memorandum, signed by the party
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 283.
31. Id. (citing Menard & Co. Masonry Bldg. Contractors v. Marshall Bldg.
Sys., Inc., 539 A.2d 523, 526 (R.I. 1988)).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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against whom the contract is sought to be enforced, that contains
the substance of the contract and each party has manifested an
objective intent to be bound thereby. Under this rule, the seller's
oral agreement to the essential terms of the sales transaction, to-
gether with an e-mail message from the owner to the prospective
buyer's representative, did not amount to a satisfaction of the stat-
ute of frauds.
The court also held that apparent authority to contract on be-
half of a principal arises from the principal's manifestation of such
authority to a third party, but such apparent authority can come
from indications of authority given by the principal to the agent
and does not have to be direct communication to the third person.
In addition, the third party with whom the agent is dealing must
reasonably believe the agent has the authority to bind its principal
to the contract. Under this rule, the buyer had failed to demon-
strate the reasonableness of the belief that the seller's attorney
possessed the apparent authority to bind the seller to the purchase
and sales agreement.
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